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WAGE GARNISHMENT IN KENTUCKY
In the modem consumer economy the future income of the consumer
has become both the source of his ability to pay and the security for the
credit extended to him. The transition in consumer wealth from property
to income remains very much in progress. At the present time, however,
the considerable wealth of the younger middle class-the backbone of
the consumer economy-lies in future income. The poor man trails be-
hind. He not only has a smaller quantity of future income with which
to acquire present enjoyment of goods and service, but he also has a lower
quality of income as security for credit. His job is less secure, and he is
less adequately assured against the unemployment of illness, disability,
old age and technological displacement ... Nevertheless, we all regard
our future income as the security for present credit, and most of us are
content to work continuously to pay our debts.'
The general public does not realize the extent to which it is
responsible for enforcing hundreds of credit agreements made daily
between consumer buyers and consumer merchants and lenders. The
public's participation arises when it acquiesces in and approves of
various processes designed to aid the creditor in collecting from de-
faulting debtors. One of the most important of these processes is wage
garnishment. This article examines wage garnishment from a historical
standpoint; discusses the relevant policy considerations; and con-
siders the statutory provisions and use of garnishment in Kentucky.
I. OmGm, NATLE AND PURPOSE OF WAGE GnNqmSmjxr
To understand the modern use of wage garnishment, it is neces-
sary to consider the processes of attachment and execution because
they serve as an historical basis for garnishment. In early England,
relief for an aggrieved plaintiff in a civil action generally took the form
of a money judgment. To enforce judgments, two writs of execution
were developed.2 The first, fieri facias, allowed the judgment creditor
to levy upon and sell the defendant's chattels. The second, elegit, per-
mitted the judgment creditor to collect the amount due him by renting
or using the debtor's real property for a term of years. These writs
'Viles, Consumer Debtor-Creditor Rights: The Law in Non-Transition, 20
VA. L.W. (Charlottesville), Mar. 7, 1968, at 1, col. 6; 3, col. 5; 4, col. 5. (This
is an article written by Robert M. Viles, Associate Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Kentucky, describing certain aspects of consumer-debtor relationships).
The authors are indebted to Mr. Viles for his assistance.
2 S. RmsExrnwD, CAsEs AN MATERIALS ON Ciumrros" t mvnrms Aim DEBT-
os' PRo TzoxN 3 (1967).
were the forerunners of the modern writ of execution which creates
a lien against all of the judgment debtor's property.3
Neither of the early English writs could be used to levy upon
any personal right or asset of the debtor which was not reduced to
his possession, e.g., property held in bailment, a debt owed to the
debtor but uncollected, or other chose in action. To overcome this
obstacle to debt collection, the English equity courts introduced the
creditor's bill, with which the creditor could satisfy his judgment by
confiscating assets belonging to the judgment debtor, but held by
another.
Building on the English practice, American courts and legislatures
condensed the various writs of execution into a single writ in the
nature of fieri facias.4 In some jurisdictions the writ was extended to
reach choses in action. In other states, however, a combination of
execution and foreign attachment was authorized.3
The order of attachment apparently antedates the beginnings of
English law. Some scholars trace it back to an old Roman practice
which allowed appropriation of the personal effects of a debtor who
was evading prosecution.6 This practice called for sending three sum-
mons to the debtor; if he did not then appear, his goods could be
seized and applied against his obligations. When attachment first
appeared in England it was not used as a collection device but as a
jurisdictional weapon with which a plaintiff could force his debtor
into court. Because default judgments were not recognized in England
until 1725,7 attachment of the debtor's goods served only to persuade
him to appear personally; they could not be used to satisfy the claim
against him upon his default. However, at this time the plaintiff could
institute attachment without earlier summons or notice of suit. It was
considered advantageous to surprise the defendant by suddenly con-
fiscating a large part of his property, thereby guaranteeing his hasty
presence in court to free it.8 When the defendant appeared, the at-
tached property was released, and it could not be held to satisfy a
money award which might issue from the trial.9 But the judgment itself
3 This paragraph is admittedly a sweeping oversimplification of an historical
process to which many learned authors have devoted treatises. For more compre-
hensive treatment, see Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American
Law-A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. RFv. 155 (1957).
4 S. RExsEumm, supra note 2, at 177.
5Id.
61 R. SHnsm, A TBEAT=ISE oN =H AsmcN LAW ov ATrAcm ENT AND
GAaNnmsmANr I (1896).
7 S. Rnzsmmman, supra note 2, at 177.
8 R. SmrN, supra note 6, at 2.
9 Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MinN. L. Rxv. 1,
10 (1942).
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could be enforced by utilizing the execution writs previously dis-
cussed and by imprisoning the judgment debtor until he paid the
debt.
Attachment soon ceased to be viewed solely as a means of bringing
the debtor personally within the court's jurisdiction when the writ be-
came recognized as an effective tool for reaching the debtor's assets
and forcing their application to the debt. Initially, the courts were re-
luctant to so extend the use of attachment, and they limited its use
to instances where the debtor was beyond the court's jurisdiction but
his assets were not. However, a number of English cities during the
Middle Ages developed the custom of foreign attachment, allowing
seizure of goods or, more frequently, debts owed to a nonresident
debtor by a third party within the court's jurisdiction.10 Foreign at-
tachment occurred at the outset of the suit, but, unlike the attachment
process generally available at that time, its effectiveness was not limited
to securing the defendant's presence; if the debtor failed to appear, the
creditor was allowed to apply the attached goods to the debt owed."
In effect the creditor could satisfy a default judgment against the
defendant-debtor by transferring liability from the person of the
absent defendant to his assets within the court's jurisdiction.
Thus, attachment became important to the creditor as a way of
satisfying the debt and somewhat less important as a means of reaching
the person of the debtor. The practical merchant well recognized that
a term in debtors' prison would seldom satisfy a delinquent account.
The American colonies, which had adopted the English merchant law
concerning third-party attachment, quickly moved beyond the English
practice and allowed a successful plaintiff to satisfy his judgment from
the sale of attached goods even when the defendant appeared per-
sonally in the action.' 2 In 1850, a Tennessee judge explained this
development:
Now, when it is remembered that the right to imprison the debtor, bad
been abolished by the Act of 1842, ch. 3, only one year before the pas-
sage of the attachment law under consideration, [broadening the grounds
of attachment] the object of the legislature in changing the attachment
law, will plainly appear.
Whilst the law permitted a party, who had obtained a judgment, to take
the body of the judgment debtor in execution, he was permitted to dis-
pose of his property, and to remove it at pleasure; because it was sup-
10 S. RIESENFELD, supra note 2, at 177.
11 If the defendant did appear he could secure release of the attached prop-
erty by submitting to imprisonment or by posting a "special bail" which guaranteed
payment of the judgmeiit or submission to imprisonment. V. Couwrmm"A, CAsEs
AN]D MATEmAS ON DEBTOR AND CRErroR 24 (1964).
12 S. RrESENm=D, supra note 2, at 178.
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posed, that if a debtor could command the means to pay off a judgment,
he would choose to apply those means, rather than render his body to
prison, in execution of it. But when the law authorizing imprisonment
for debt was repealed, the debtor would be under a temptation to re-
move, or conceal his property, to prevent the payment of his debt;
himself remaining within the jurisdiction of the court, exempt from
arrest, and putting his creditor at defiance. To prevent such a state of
things, the legislature enacted the attachment law of 1843. The whole
tenor of that act shows, that the object was to give the creditor the
means of getting security for his debt.1a
Apparently, the use of third-party attachment to levy upon wages
due the debtor has never been questioned. Once the plaintiffs" rights
against the chose in action became enforceable, uncollected wages
were treated no differently than any other debt. However, from very
early days it has also been recognized that certain assets of the debtor
merit special protection against levy. In 1285, the Statute of West-
minister II declared that a debtor's oxen and beasts of plough were
immune from attachment,14 to safeguard his means of earning a liveli-
hood. Statutory exemptions for homesteads, wearing apparel, tools of
the trade, and household essentials are common to most jurisdictions.
This policy of protecting at least part of the debtor's wages from
attachment is recognized in the garnishment statutes of most states and
will be discussed infra.
The procedures and scope of attachment vary widely from state
to state. Because it is recognized as a statutory remedy available only
in derogation of the common law,'15 peculiarities and differences have
been strictly construed. But the remedy itself is firmly established in
all fifty states and is a recognized part of American business practice.
II. KENTUCKY WAGE GA iuSmvENT LAW
The remedieg available to creditors in Kentucky through judicial
process are codified in three chapters of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes [hereinafter referred to as KRS].16 The captions of the
chapters suggest an eminently rational, topical division. It should be
apparent by its heading, "Provisional Remedies," that Chapter 425
deals with all devices available to the plaintiff-creditor before judg-
ment. The principal provisional remedy provided is attachment of the
defendant's property upon the plaintiffs showing that satisfaction of
13 Boyd v. Buckingbam, 29 Tenn. 484, 485 (1850).
14 S. RiESENFELD, supra note 2, at 230.
15 6 Am. Jun. 2d Attachment and Garnishment § 7 (1963).
16 Ky. rV. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] ch. 425 (1962) (Provisional
Remedies); KRS ch. 426 (1962) (Enforcement of Judgments); KRS ch. 427
(1962) (Exemptions).
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his potential judgment would be jeopardized by delay in seizing or
encumbering the defendant's estate" * It would seem that when the
interests of the defendant are within the control of a third party
against whom process could be directed, these interests could also be
attached, i.e., garnisheed. The title of Chapter 426, "Enforcement of
Judgments," seems to permit the inference that the Chapter contains
all devices available to the plaintiff for enforcing a judgment, primarily
execution and sale of the judgment debtor's property, including that
in the hands of a third party garnishee. Similarly, Chapter 427,
"Exemptions," sets out separately the substantive law which excludes
certain kinds and amounts of the defendant-debtor's property from
seizure or encumbrance by any kind of judicial process, whether at-
tachment, execution, garnishment, or equitable relief.
However, one who undertakes to draw reasonable inferences from
these chapter headings would be misled as to the actual contents of the
chapters, except for Chapter 427, which does contain the principal
exemption law of Kentucky, including exemptions from wage garnish-
ment.18 Chapter 425, "Provisional Remedies," contains all of Ken-
tucky's garnishment law, including garnishment before and after
-17KRS § 425.185 (1962).
18KRS § 427.010 (1962). as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966). KRS § 427.045
(Cumi. Supp. 1966) provides: "The exemptions provided in KRS 425.210,
427.010 to 427.040 shall not apply for executions, attachments, or garnishments,
issued for the collection of maintenance of minor children."
Other state exemption provisions are KRS § 161.700 (1962) (teacher's re-
tirement funds); KRS § 205.220 (3) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966)
(public assistance); KRS § 206.170 (1962) (Confederate pensions); KRS §
304.691 (1) (1962) (proceeds, including cash surrender value, of life insurance
policies); KRS § 341.470 (1962) (unemployment compensation rights); KRS §
342.180 (1962) (workmen's compensation claims and payments); and KRS §
426.170 (1962) (growing crops, in certain cases).
Federal exemption provisions are 5 U.S.C. § 2265 (1964) (retirement funds
of civil service employees of the United States); 22 U.S.C. § 1104 (1964)
(moneys payable under the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability system);
33 U.S.C. § 916 (1964) (benefits for death and disability of persons covered by
the Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); 38 U.S.C. § 562 (1964)
(special pensions paid to winners of the Co;ngressional Medal of Honor); 38 U.S.C.
§ 3101 (1964) (benefits under any law administered by the United States Vet-
erans Administration); 42 U.S.C. "§ 407 (1964) ("moneys paid or navable or
rights existing" under the Social Securities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1717 (194) (com-
pensation for injury or death from war riskc haznrds suffered outside the United
States by certain persons); 43 U.S.C. § 175 (1964) (federal homestead lands or
debts contracted before issuance of the patent); 45 U.S.C. § 228(L) (1964)
(annuities and pensions under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937); 45 U.S.C.
§ 352 (E) (1964) (Railroad Unemployment Insurance benefits); and 46 U.S.C. §
601 (1964) (wages of fishermen employed on fishing vessels, seamen and ap-
prentices).
Effective July 1, 1970, Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act will
greatly modify the garnishment practices in many states. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1232. See notes 128 and 147 infra for a more extensive discussion of
this Act.
[Vol. 5'7,
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judgment. Chapter 426 contains none at all.' 9 The explanation for
this arrangement lies not in some bizarre streak of irrationality in past
generations of Kentucky legislators, but in the historical antecedents of
modem garnishment law. As stated previously,20 the remedy of garnish-
ment developed mainly from early attachment, and the process of
garnishment after judgment continued to resemble garnishment be-
fore judgment. In fact, the process and remedy of wage garnishment
is regulated by the same statute in Kentucky.21
However, the grounds or conditions on which the plaintiff-creditor
may obtain garnishment vary according to whether it is sought before
or after judgment. A parallel may be drawn between the grounds or
conditions separating the provisional remedy of ordinary attachment
22
and the post-judgment remedy of execution, levy, and sale.23 The net
result of the awkward statutory framework is considerable semantic
confusion for anyone attempting to use the garnishment statutes. This
confusion could lead to mistakes in construing and applying the
statutes.
The statutes provide that "any person in whose favor a final judg-
ment in personam has been entered in any court of record of this
state may... obtain an order of garnishment,' 24 i.e., post-judgment
garnishment. This section sets forth the process for garnishment, in-
corporating by reference one specified prejudgment attachment pro-
vision2 5 and most of the remaining ones "as far as applicable."26 To
obtain garnishment, the judgment creditor need only file an affidavit
describing the judgment, indicating the amount outstanding, and
stating "that one or more persons hold property belonging to, or are
indebted to, the judgment debtor....f 27
Chapter 425 contains no other statutory authority specifically pro-
viding for "garnishment." Thus, a strict construction of the statute
would seem to prohibit pre-judgment garnishment. However, KRS §
19 KRS § 426.381 (1962) provides that in an ancillary discovery proceeding
in equity, the plaintiff "may have an attachment against the property of the de-
fendant in the execution, similar to the general attachments provided for in KRS
425.185 to 425.520 ... . Garnishment would be authorized under this section.
20 See text at notes 6 to 11 supra.
2 1 KRS § 425.210 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
22 KRS § 425.185 (1962).
23 KRS § 426.010 (1962).
24 KRS § 425.190 (1962).
25 KRS § 425.190(3) (1962) states: "The order of garnishment shall be served
on the persons named as garnishees in the manner provided in subsection (8) of
KRS 425.225, and in addition a copy thereof shall be served on the judgment
debtor." 1 1
26 KRS § 425.190(7) (1962) provides: "The provisions of K, RS 427.010 to
427.130 and KRS 425.215 to 425.520 shall as far as applicable govern proceedings
under the order."
27KRS § 425.190(1) (1962).
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425.185 states that "the plaintiff may, at or after the commencement
of an action, have an attachment against the property of the defendant
... as a security for the satisfaction of such judgment as may be re-
covered." The courts and attorneys of Kentucky have interpreted this
provision to authorize attachment of any property of the defendant,
including property held or debts owed by third parties. Such "third
party attachment" is the pre-judgment equivalent of post-judgment
"garnishment."28
Because pre-judgment garnishment is statutorily a variety of at-
tachment, one of the several conditions precedent to attachment must
be met by a creditor-plaintiff who seeks to attach wages or other
property of the defendant-debtor controlled by a third party.29 How-
ever, the conditions seem not to envisage "wages" as property of the
debtor. The condition allowed in subsection (2) shows this failure
clearly: attachment is available to the plaintiff "in an action for the re-
covery of money due upon a contract, judgment, or award"-i.e., most
consumer debts incurred for purchases and loans-if: 1) "the de-
fendant [has] no property in this state subject to execution, or not
enough thereof to satisfy the plaintiff's demand"-likely to be the cir-
cumstances under the liberalized property exemption allowances en-
acted in 19663 0-and 2) "the collection of the demand will be en-
dangered by delay in obtaining judgment"-rarely demonstrable--"or
a return of no property found"-again likely because of the liberalized
exemption allowances31 and the prevalent existence of security in-
terests in commercially valuable consumer possessions. (Emphasis
added.) Thus it can be realistically concluded that in the ordinary
consumer debt action against the typical wage-earning debtor, wage
28The construction of KRS § 425.185 (1962) to include provisional garnish-
ment is supported by the strong interlineation of 'garnishment" and "attachment"
provisions in Chapter 425. E.g., KRS § 425.225 (1962) provides:
The order of attachment shall be executed by the sheriff without
delay in the following manner: . . . (3) Upon other personal property,
by delivering a copy of the order, with a notice specifying the property
attached, to the person holding it; or as to a debt or demand, to the
person owing it; or as to stock in a corporation, or property held, or a debt
or demand owing by it, to the officer or agent upon whom a summons
may be served, and by summoning the person or corporation to answer
as a garnishee in the action. The sheriff shall deliver copies to, and
summon, such persons as garnishees as the plaintiff may direct. But no
notice need be given in any case describing or specifying the debt or
demand attached, but only a notice that the persons or corporation to
whom the order of attachment is delivered is summoned to answer as
a garnishee in the manner and at the time provided for an answer by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis added.)
29 KRS § 425.185 (1962).
S0 KRS §§ 427.010-.040 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
81 Id.
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garnishment may automatically issue. The plaintiff need only submit an
affidavit averring that the ground exists32 and file a bond executed by
one or more sufficient sureties (other than himself) who agree to pay
the defendant "all damages which he may sustain by reason of the at-
tachment, if the order be wrongfully obtained, not exceeding double
the amount of the plaintiffs claim."33
While the grounds for pre-judgment and post-judgment garnish-
ment differ, the process of wage garnishment is the same for both.
The "order of attachment" must be issued in triplicate to the employer-
garnishee,3 4 and must contain much more information than the order
used to garnishee other types of property and debts.35 Printed in-
structions must appear on the order directing that the employer de-
liver one copy to his employee-defendant, retain one copy for his
records, and return the third copy to the court36 with the non-exempt
portion of his employee's wages attached.3 7 By placing upon the em-
ployer the responsibility of furnishing his employee with a copy of the
wage garnishment order,3 8 the legislature abolished the sheriff's duty
to serve a copy of the order upon the defendant, a duty required for
the garnishment of other property or debts.
3 9
Other information must be printed on the order form to assist the
employer in accurately determining the portion of wages which he
must remit to the court and the amount he may turn over to his
employee. Net wages, upon which all calculations must be made,
consist of the total amount due as of the end of the employer's pay
period during which the attachment or levy of execution is served less
amounts withheld for taxes and fees due federal, state, and local govern-
32 KRS § 425.195(4) (1962).
33KRS §425.250 (1962).
34 KRS §425.210 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
35Ch 84, § 10, [1952] Ky. Acts 218 (codified until 1966 as KRS § 425.210)
provided:
The order of attachment [shall direct the sheriff] to attach and safely
keep the property of the defendant in his county not exempt from execu-
tion, or so much thereof as will satisfy the plaintiffs claim specified in
his affidavit, which shall be stated in the order, and the probable costs
of the action, not exceeding thirty dollars; also to summon the garnishees
to answer in the action in the manner and at the time required for an
answer by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and to make due return thereof.
The order shall be returnable as an order of arrest is directed to be re-
turned.
Forms secured from court clerks at interviews and through return of question-
naires (see notes 58 and 97 infra) indicate that the above language is used as
the basis for all forms used to garnishee property and debts other than wages,
and is combined with KRS § 425.210 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966)
as the basis of content for wage garnishment orders.
36KRS § 425.210(4) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
3TK7S § 425.210(5) (1962), as amended (Cumm. Supp. 1966).
38KRS § 425.210(4) (1962), as amended, (Cumm. Supp. 1966).
39KRS § 425.190(3) (1962).
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ments, union dues, medical insurance and retirement programs.4o
Prior to 1966, only wages earned as of the date of receipt of the order
of garnishment were subject to garnishment,41 and it was not clear
whether net wages or gross wages were the basis on which the amount
of the wage exemption was to be determined.4
The court clerk must determine the applicable wage exemption
rate and enter it on the order of garnishment.43 Although in other
garnishment proceedings a debtor must claim his exemption,44 he en-
joys an automatic exemption in wage garnishment.45 Seventy-five per-
cent of his net wages subject to garnishment are exempted,4 unless
the debt on which the action arose was for necessities, in which case
only fifty percent of the net wages are exempt.47 "Articles of food,
clothing (including shoes), medicine, medical services, drugs, rent
and public utilities, furniture and household appliances"48 are listed as
necessities.
The order of garnishment must direct the employer-garnishee to
answer within twenty days after receiving the order.49 This require-
ment can be met simply by entering the net wages due the employee
on the reverse side of the employer's copy of the garnishment order,
and returning this copy to the court with a check for the non-exempt
portion of the wages. 50 If no wages are due, the employer must so
state and indicate the reason.51 After sending a completed copy of the
garnishment order to the court, with the non-exempt portion of the
wages, and giving a second copy of the order to the employee-de-
fendant, the employer is free from further responsibility in the wage
garnishment process. 52 On the other hand, the employer's failure to
40 KRS § 425.210(3) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
(Emphasis adlded.)
41 Ch. 10, [1930] Ky. AcTs 40 (codified until 1966 as ICS § 427.010(2)
provided:prvde:[Njinety per centun (90%) of the salary, wages or income earned
by labor, of every person earning a salary, wages, or income of seventy-
five ($75.00) or less per month, provided that the lien created by service
of garnishment, execution, or attachment, shall only affect ten per centum
(10%) of such salary, wages, or income, earned at the time of service
of process.... (Emphasis added.)
42 Id.
43 KRS § 425.210(2) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
44 KRS § 425.190(4) (1962).
45KRS §§ 425.210(1)-(2) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
46 For income exempt from garnishment see note 18 supra.
47KRS § 427.010(2) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).4 8KRS § 427.010(3) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
49KRS § 425.190(1) (1962) requires the garnishee "to answer in the
manner and at the time required tor an answer by the Rules of Civil Procedure
.... Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.01 requires an answer within twenty days after service.
50 KRS §§ 425.210(4)-(5) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
51KRS § 425.210(6) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
52 KRS § 425.310 (1962).
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answer or make a satisfactory disclosure may result in punishment for
contempt 53 and even in attachment of his property to satisfy the em-
ployee's debt.54
No creditor has statutory priority over any other creditor in
obtaining an order garnisheeing wages or other property. Priority is
determined solely according to date and time of delivery of process to
the sheriff for service upon the garnishee.55 Because an order of wage
garnishment is effective only for the pay period in which it is levied,56
a creditor whose debt is not satisfied by one wage garnishment must
seek a new and separate garnishment order, or several successive
orders, in order to obtain further satisfaction. There is no statutory
limit on the number of times a creditor may seek and obtain wage
garnishment,5 7 but prior orders of garnishment on the same debt
give no priority, and the creditor who is the first to deliver his order
to the sheriff during each of the debtor's pay periods prevails.
III. WAGE GA -ISMMNT PAcEcE IN KE=CKY
At some time, nearly every lender and merchant must decide
whether to resort to wage garnishment to collect a delinquent con-
sumer debt. What factors influence the Kentucky creditor's decision?
Which Kentucky consumer creditors resort most often to wage garnish-
ment? How strictly do the Kentucky courts adhere to the governing
statutory provisions? This section of the article attempts to answer
these and other questions.58
It appears that the most frequent users of the wage garnishment
process for collecting consumer debts are small loan and finance com-
panies.59 The installment obligations owed them range from signature
loans, with the money spent to satisfy the borrower's personal desires,
to loans and time-purchase agreements to finance purchases of major
appliances automobiles, boats, etc., to loans consolidating numerous
5 KRS § 425.235 (1962).
5 KRS § 425.325 (1962).GG KtRS § 425.220 (1962).
56 See note 40 supra, and accompanying text.57KRS § 425.190(6) (1962).58 lnterviews were conducted with six circuit court clerks, five quarterly
court clerks, and three justices of the peace and their records were analyzed.
Eleven finance company credit managers, the vice president of a large Central
Kentucky collection agency, and two attorneys specializing in debt collection
were also interviewed. Questionnaires, in which the court clerks were asked to
draw upon their experience and give reasonable estimates on certain requested
data, were sent to 120 circuit courts (forty-one returned and completed), 120
uarterly courts (twenty-seven returned and completed), and six justices courts
two returned and completed).
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debts. Installment sales obligations and small loans for the purchase of
consumer goods predominate.
The larger loan and finance companies usually have their own
procedures for debt collection and do not turn their delinquent ac-
counts over to independent collection agencies, but most of the smaller
companies also make some attempt to collect. In most instances
numerous letters are sent to the debtor and efforts are made to per-
sonally contact him before consideration is given to judicial process.
However, when sixty to eighty days have elapsed after a payment has
become due and unpaid, smaller companies will often resort to stronger
collection procedures. By then, the financial condition of the debtor
is known to the creditor and he has attempted to devise some payment
extension plan whereby the debtor agrees to pay regularly at least a
nominal amount. If the debtor is unable to make any payments what-
soever, the creditor may simply write the loan off as a loss. However,
if the creditor believes that the debtor is only refusing to make a pay-
ment, the creditor may resort to judicial process and wage garnish-
ment. Loan and finance companies have found that, because of court
costs, only a small portion of a debt is collectible through wage
garnishment. Thus, wage garnishment is only one weapon in an arsenal
of devices for encouraging or coercing the debtor to pay his debt.
After suffering one or two wage garnishments, a debtor usually
recognizes that the court costs and the possibility of losing his job
dictate that he either make some suitable arrangement with his
creditor or seek relief in bankruptcy.60
Collection agencies are a second major user of wage garnishment.61
Collection agency accounts include a wide variety of debts, usually
placed by creditors whose collection efforts have been minimal.
Doctors, hospitals, and small retailers are the most frequent clients of
collection agencies. The delinquency of debts turned over for collection
range from one day, e.g., when a tenant has vacated without paying
his rent, to over six months, e.g., when a physician who has done little
to collect his fees suddenly finds himself with more accounts receivable
than cash income. However, collection agencies regard wage garnish-
ment in the same light as do finance and loan companies. Although a
59 Question 19 on the questionnaire asked: "Who are the greatest users of
wage garnishment?" Finance and loan companies were listed by almost all of the
clerks completing and returning the questionnaires. Where the clerks attempted
to show the ratio of the listedusers to the whole, finance and loan companies
were given the highest percentage. The interviews and records contained nothing
to indicate otherwise.60 Information in this paragraph was obtained from credit managers of finance
and loan companies in interviews.
61 See note 59 supra. Collection agencies were listed by clerks on the question-
naires as the second most frequent user of garnishment process.
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less reputable collection agency may resort to the courts more quickly
and more often than a larger, more reputable agency, both consider
wage garnishment only as a device to force the debtor to make some
arrangement for paying his debt.
62
A third major group utilizing wage garnishment are credit jewelry,
clothing, and furniture retailers.63 Although many of these merchants
entrust their delinquent accounts to collection agencies, many do their
own collecting. Large department stores tend to resemble finance
companies and collection agencies in their use of wage garnishment.
Smaller credit retailers who do not resort to collection agencies seem
to rely much more heavily upon wage garnishment as a collection de-
vice and as a method of forcing the debtor to make payment arrange-
ments.64 Ascertaining the frequency with which consumer creditors
such as physicians, hospitals, neighborhood grocery stores, and other
small creditors resort to the courts for collection of debts is made dif-
ficult by their frequent resort to collection agencies, who file suit in
their own names.6
Whether the individual creditor or the collection agency makes
the ultimate decision to utilize garnishment or other judicial process,
the decision of whether to employ an attorney to prosecute the action
must be made. If the plaintiff is a corporate entity, an attorney must
be employed because corporations are forbidden to practice law.66
Even if the unincorporated creditor has the expertise, time, and
patience to prosecute his own suit, a locally-imposed court rule re-
quiring all suits to be ified by an attorney may also remove his power
of choice. Although anyone may draw up "any instrument to which he
is a party,"67 most court clerks fear that any assistance they render to a
plaintiff who is attempting to fie his own suit, will be deemed to be
practicing law without a license.68 Accordingly most court clerks re-
62 Much of this information was obtained in an interview with the vice presi-
dent of a large collection agency in Central Kentucky.
63 See note 59 supra. When these users are grouped together, they comprise
a large portion of those who seek wage garnishment.
(4 No specific question in the sampling would confirm this. However, after
analysis of all the data, this appears to be a valid conclusion.
65 This information was gained by personal interviews and perusal of records.
60 While a corporation is considered a person for many purposes . . .it
is recognized that one cannot be licensed to practice a learned profession,
which can only be done by an individual who has received a license to
do so after proving his qualefications and knowledge of the subject.
Thus, there is scarcely any judicial dissent from the proposition that a
corporation cannot lawfully engage in the practice of law or of medicine.
Kendall v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 789, 175 S.W.2d 489, 493 (1943).
67 R. oF CT. OF APP. 3.020. The Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that this Rule should not be limited to natural persons in Hobson v.
Kentucky Trust Co., 303 Ky. 493, 197 S.W.2d 454 (1946).
68 Clerks voiced this fear in interviews.
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quire all suits to be ified by an attorney.69 If the creditor already em-
ploys an attorney on retainer, this requirement presents no obstacle.
But other creditors may encounter some hesitancy among attorneys to
prosecute claims for fifty dollars or less. Many attorneys feel that the
small fees derived from such suits do not justify the time and effort re-
quired to prosecute them.70 Some court clerks recognize such re-
luctance and make an exception to their general rule against pro se
representation by allowing anyone to file his own suit if it is for fifty
dollars or less.71 At least one attorney who processes many creditors'
claims believes that this exception is often abused by corporate credi-
tors whose credit managers file suit as individuals.
A person bringing an action must determine in which of the local
courts he will file suit. If the action is for a debt of fifty dollars or less,
it must be filed in the quarterly or justice's court,72 and if it is for more
than five hundred dollars, the action must be filed in circuit court.
73
A suit for an amount between the foregoing minimum and maximum
limits may be filed in quarterly, justice's or circuit court. However,
heavy caseloads cause a longer delay before final action in most
circuit courts,74 and this may convince the creditor to seek another
forum. Moreover, many chcuit courts even encourage attorneys to
file creditors' suits in lower courts. The requirement that most circuit
court judges must "ride circuit" through several counties75 means that
the quarterly court judge or the magistrate is often more accessible for
immediate action upon the plaintiff's suit. An additional consideration
is that the fee compensation system present in most counties may en-
courage a cooperative spirit in lower court judges and clerks for
entertaining creditors' suits, thereby indirectly influencing the creditor
in his choice of forum.76
69 Question five on the questionnaire asked: "Who is allowed to file suit
for debt actions?" Twenty-six circuit court clerks and 8 quarterly court clerks
indicated that only attorneys are allowed to file suit in their courts.
70 Interviews with court clerks and attorneys.
71 See note 69 supra. Nine quarterly court clerks answered that they made
special exception to their general rule only in suits for fifty dollars or less.
72 KRS § 25.410 (1962) and KRS § 25.610 (1962) give exclusive and con-
current jurisdiction to quarterly and justice's courts for suits of fifty dollars or less.
73 KRS § 25.410 (1962) limits the ursdiction of quarterly and justice's courts
to suits for no more than five hundred dolars. KRS § 23.010 (1962) gives circuit
courts original jurisdiction over all suits not exclusively delegated to some other
tribunal.
74 Reviews of circuit court records show that the broader jurisdiction of that
court results in a greater number of cases being filed there than in a lower court
of the same county. However, there is a longer period of time between filing and
final action in these suits.
75IKRS § 23.040 (1962) provides for forty-nine judicial districts. In all but
sixteen of these districts, two or more counties (circuit courts) are grouped
together to form one judicial district.
76KRS § 64.535 (Cumi. Supp. 1966) provides:
(Continued on next page)
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Upon filing suit, the plaintiff must deposit certain sums with the
court clerk as credit toward anticipated court costs, including clerk's
fees, state tax, library fees, and sheriff's fees. Circuit court clerks collect
ten dollars as credit toward clerk's fees accruing in the action.
77 Most
quarterly and justice's court clerks also require an advance deposit to-
ward clerk's or judge's fees.78 All court clerks must levy a five dollar
state tax on all original actions in the circuit court and on all original
actions in other courts where the suit exceeds fifty dollars.
7 9
Counties containing second, third, or fourth class cities are autho-
rized to tax as court costs a sum not to exceed one dollar for all actions
filed in the circuit court, and up to fifty cents for all actions filed in
quarterly or justice's courts, which is to be used for maintenance of
the county law library.80 The clerk may require a deposit of up to five
dollars to cover the sheriffs fees for serving summons and other papers
in the action.8 ' The counties seem to be split, however, over who
actually collects the advance deposit. Where the clerk delivers the sum-
mons to the sheriff for service, the clerk usually collects the deposit. But
in counties where the attorney delivers the summons directly to the
sheriff, a representative from the sheriff's office usually collects the
fees. 12 The deposits enumerated here may not cover the entire costs
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
The county court clerk, circuit clerk, county judge, sheriff, county
attorney, and jailer of each county shall receive an annual salary of $9600
to be paid solely out of the statutory fees and salaries received by him
during the calendar year. (Emphasis added.)
In many counties the county judge serves as the quarterly court judge (KRS §
25.450 (1962) and thereby also becomes the quarterly court clerk (KRS §
25.025(1) (1962), unless he otherwise designates (KRS § 25.025(2) (1962) or
KRS § 25.480 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
KRS § 64.530(1) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966) requires the
fiscal court to set the maximum compensation of county officers from either salary,
fees, or a combination of salary and fees. Justices of the peace are deemed to be
county officers or purposes of the statute. KRS § 64.255 (1962) authorizes fiscal
courts, at their option, to compensate justices of the peace from the county
treasury exclusively for their duties "in so far as they relate to the trial or decision
of criminal cases." The bulk of their total compensation, however, is derived from
the fees they collect in civil cases or from criminal cases in those counties not
electing to compensate them by saary.
77 KRS § 64.030 (1962). A few circuit court clerks indicated on question-
naires that they collected as much as twenty dollars. Information obtained through
interviews with other court clerks indicates that they probably collect the larger
deposit pursuant to an order from the presiding circuit court judge.
78 KRS § 64.250(1) (1962) authorizes justices of the peace in counties with
a population of 250,000 to collect a one dollar deposit. There seems to be no
other statutory provision for quarterly or justice's court clerks to collect a deposit
for clerk or judges fees. Answers to the questionnaires indicate, however, that
they usually collect a deposit of up to ten dollars.
7 KRS § 142.011(1) (1962).
8KRS § 172.180(3)(b) (1962).
82This variation in procedure was discovered through interviews with court
clerks.
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which will accrue in the action, and the creditor may have to pay
additional court costs upon entry of judgment if the money received
by the court clerk from the defendant debtor has been insufficient to
cover them.
83
When suit is filed in his court, the clerk must prepare a summons
for the sheriff to serve upon the defendant. Although the summons
directs the defendant to answer the complaint within twenty days, it
does not indicate the nature of the complaint, the amount for which
the suit is brought, or even how a copy of the complaint may be ob-
tained.84 Unlike federal procedure,8 5 Kentucky law does not require a
copy of the complaint to be attached to the summons.8 6 A few courts
do so, however, as a courtesy to the defendant.
8 7
If the defendant does not answer the complaint within twenty days,
the plaintiff may obtain a default judgment.88 Over seventy-five percent
of all actions filed for debt in circuit courts 9 and over ninety percent
of those filed in quarterly and justice's courts9° result in entry of default
judgments. One factor which may contribute to the high rate of default
judgments is the failure to attach a copy of the complaint to the sum-
mons. However, because the name of the plaintiff appears on the sum-
mons, one finds it difficult to believe that the defendant has no know-
ledge of the claim if he knows to whom he owes debts. It seems likely
that in most instances the defendant knows or believes he has no de-
fense to the suit and therefore sees no reason to defend. Even if he
believes he does have a defense, he may realize that he must hire an
attorney to effectively present it, and because a defendant sued on a
83The authorized deposits listed in the text total twenty-one dollars. The
appendix shows that even in a simple case court costs will amount to $21.85 where
garnishment is sought. Additional exhibits an answer by the defendant, the
necessity of issuing additional summons, additional garnishments, or any number
of other unforeseen (but normal) events, push court costs even higher.
84 See Ky. R. Civ. P. [hereinafter cited as CR1 Official Form 1.85 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
86 See CR 4.01. See also 1 W. CLAY, RuLs oF Civni PiocEDURE ANoTATED
18 (1963).87Question nine on the questionnaire asked: "Do you attach a copy of the
complaint to the summons served upon the defendant?" Six circuit court clerks,
six quarterly court clerks, and both justices of the peace answered "Yes." A few
others indicated they did if requested to do so by the plaintiff's attorney.8 8 CR 55.01.
89Question fifteen on the questionnaire asked: "What percentage of suits
for debt terminate in default judgments?" Of thirty-nine circuit court clerks
responding, twenty-six indicated over fifty percent; twenty of these indicated over
seventy-five percent. Interviews and reviews of records substantiate the seventy-
five percent answer.
90 See note 89 supra. Only twelve of twenty-eight quarterly and justice's
court clerks reported over ninety percent default judgments. Jefferson County was
among those counties, however, and the ninety percent rate is otherwise rein-
forced by the information obtained in the Lexington-Central Kentucky area inter-
views.
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consumer debt is often without liquid assets, he may feel either that it
is useless to hire an attorney or that he simply cannot afford one.
A great percentage of defaults may be somewhat distorted by a
practice prevalent in some courts of obtaining a confession of judg-
ment from the debtor after suit has been filed.91 In exchange for more
lenient terms, a debtor may confess judgment. This practice does not
seem unfair to the debtor if he is fully advised of the implications and
consequences of his action. Some magistrates and quarterly court
judges encourage the debtor to confess judgment because it, in effect,
requires him to answer the complaint and become informed of the
nature of the claim against him.92 On the other hand, a confession of
judgment waives all claims of error and other defenses which the
debtor might have raised.93 Whether judgment is entered after default
or after confession of judgment, a creditor can usually expect that his
claim will be handled entirely within the office of the court clerk, and
that it will go before a judge only for signature on the judgment order.
The procedures for obtaining wage garnishment are essentially the
same for garnishment before and after judgment, except for the dif-
ference in the affidavit9 4 and the requirement that bond be posted for
garnishment before judgment.9 5 The statutory section outlining the
new streamlined wage garnishment procedures requires that certain
information be printed on the order of garnishment, 6 commonly known
as the "garnishee summons." The Legislature did not prescribe the
exact format of the order and the courts have procured their forms
from many different suppliers. However, the forms seem to be uniform
throughout the sate and if completed properly, most comply with the
statute.9 7 Most court clerks complete the prescribed number of copies,
but a few, apparently confused by the conflicting provisions of KRS
§ 425.190(3)98 and KRS § 425.210(4),"" still require that a copy of the
91 KIRS § 372.140 (1962) voids all contract agreements conferring powers of
attorney to confess judgment when such power is given before an action has been
instituted. KRS § 454.090 (1962) authorizes a defendant to confess judgment
after an action has been brought against him. Although court clerks and at-
torneys indicated that confessed judgments are frequently entered they were
unable to give any information concerning the extent of this practice.92 This was substantiated by interviews.
03KRS § 454.100 (1962).
94Compare KRS § 425.185 (1962), with KRS § 425.190(1) (1962).
95 KRS § 425.205 (1962).96KRS § 425.210 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
o7Sample forms were obtained during interviews with court clerks. Other
clerks attached copies of their forms to the questionnaires.9SKRS § 425.190(3) (1962) provides that: "The order of garnishment
shall be served on the persons named as garnishees .. . and in addition a copy
thereof shall be served on the iudgment debtor.
99KRS § 425.210(4) (1962) as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966), directs
that the employer deliver a copy of the order of garnishment to-his employee.
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order be served upon the defendant by the sheriff,100 thereby increasing
the costs for service of process. 1 1
In addition to the information prescribed by KRS § 425.210, forms
used by the courts also require that the total amount of the plaintiff's
claim and an estimate of court costs be entered thereon. 02 Estimates
vary widely from court to court and from county to county, ranging
from ten to fifty dollars. 13 A few court clerks enter only the exact
costs that have accrued in the action prior to and including the current
wage garnishment, but most realize that more than one garnishment
is often necessary to satisfy the judgment and accordingly enter a
figure sufficiently large to cover the total costs of the suit plus
several garnishments. 10 4
Unless the complaint specifically states that the debtor is entitled
to only a fifty percent exemption of his net wages, court clerks auto-
matically enter the seventy-five percent rate. Moreover, most clerks
are careful to verify the exemption rate stated in the complaint against
the reason stated for the debt, i.e., whether it was actually incurred for
a necessity. Unless the defendant appears to contest the exemption rate
applied to him, there seems to be no source of information other than
the sworn complaint and supporting affidavits upon which the clerk
can rely. 05
Court clerks report that employers are generally cooperative and
comply with their statutory duties. This is understandable since any
employer failing to return the court copy of the wage garnishment
100 When interviewed, one court clerk stated that the sheriff serves one copy
upon the defendant. Questionnaire answers were inconclusive, but the conclusion
that other courts still follow the older practice of KRS § 425.190(3) (1962) was
possible.
101KRS § 64.090 (1962) appears to authorize the sheriff to charge a two
dollar fee for each party served.
102 This requirement is a carryover from former practice which provided that
"the probable costs of the action' should be stated in the order of garnishment.
See note 35 supra.
103 Question thirty-seven on the questionnaire asked: "What estimated court
costs do you put on the garnishment form sent to employers?"
104The appendix shows that the cost of obtaining subseqffent garnishments
might account for the variation in estimates of court costs, and it lends validity
to the practice referred to in the text. This practice was originally revealed to
the authors in interviews with court clerks.
105 The basic information in this paragraph was obtained through interviews
with court clerks. Other court clerks seem to verify the information by listing on
the questionnaires relatively lower percentages of wage garnishments in which
defendant's wages were subject to only fifty percent exemption than the frequency
of use by furniture stores, grocers, doctors, druggists, hospitals, and landlords
would indicate. In the interviews, several clerks stated that they never enter the
fifty percent exemption rate on a wage garnishment order obtained by finance or
small loan comnanies. Since necessities can not be purchased from finance or small
loan companies, the clerks did not believe there was any way of determining
whether the loan proceeds were actually expended for necessities.
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order is subsequently ordered to appear in court 106 Clerks report, how-
ever, that a substantial number of wage garnishment orders are re-
turned indicating that no wages are due for payment to the defendant
because he is no longer employed by the garnishee or owes money to
his employer.10 7 The first wage garnishment order frequently recovers
a sum that is insufficient to cover the accrued court costs; seldom is a
very large amount applied to reduction of the debt.108 Thus, few
judgments are satisfied by wage garnishment alone.
To obtain wage garnishment before judgment, a plaintiff must
file an affidavit outlining the existence of a specified satutory condi-
tion,109 and post bond to insure the defendant against harm from a
wrongful garnishment."10 The affidavit usually does not allege any facts
tending to show why the plaintiff thinks he would be prejudiced, and
these are not required by the clerk. However, reliance by clerks upon
the sworn complaint and affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney appears to
be both reasonable and necessary. But simple reliance upon the sworn
affidavit of a layman filing his own suit may not be enough because he
probably has insufficient knowledge of the law, does not fully under-
stand that to which he is swearing and is predominately concerned in
collecting his claim. Unless the defendant appears to defend, the plain-
tiff need not fear revelation that his garnishment is ungrounded and
106 This was determined through interviews with court clerks.
107 Question twenty-one on the questionnaire asked: "What percentage of
wage garnishments result in no money received by the court?" Twenty-eight
circuit court clerks, twenty-one quarterly court clerks, and one justice of the peace
reported that no money is received from ten percent or more of all wage garnish-
ment orders issued.
10s If the debtor has net wages of one hundred dollars, only twenty-five
dollars will be received from the first garnishment order issued for a debt for
non-necessities. That sum leaves little to be applied towards the debt after court
costs are deducted. See the appendix. If the debtor has net wages of only sixty
dollars (probably a more typical net wage for a garnisheed Kentucky debtor), only
fifteen dollars will be received, a sum not even sufficient to cover the court costs.
109Affidavits usually recite the language of KRS § 425.185(2) (1962):
[The defendant has] no property in this state subject to execution,
or not enough thereof to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, and the collection
of the demand will be endangered by delay in obtaining judgment or a
return of no property found.
The courts often furnish an affidavit form reciting the statutory language, with a
surety bond agreement printed at the bottom. (Question seven on the question-
naire asked: "Have you devised any forms wfiich are used as a combined
affidavit for garnishment before judgment and surety bond?" Four circuit court
clerks, fourteen quarterly court clerks, and both justices of the peace answered
Yes.') In courts permitting anyone to fie suit himself for fifty dollars or less,
the form often serves as the complaint as well as affidavit for garnishment and
surety bond. (Question eight on the questionnaire asked: "If the answer to
the preceding question is yes, does that form also serve as the complaint by the
creditor in filing suit?" One circuit court clerk, thirteen quarterly court clerks,
and both justices of the peace answered "Yes.")
110 KRS § 425.205 (1962).
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the consequent forfeiture of his bond. No clerk or attorney interviewed
could recall a single instance in which a garnishment bond was for-
feited. Even if garnishment can be shown to have been wrongfully
obtained, irreparable harm may have already occurred, since the de-
fendant's employer usually receives the order of garnishment at about
the same time that the defendant receives his summons to defend the
suit. If the employer has a strict policy of dismissing employees whose
wages are garnisheed, the defendant is likely to find himself without
a job before he has an opportunity to challenge the garnishment, to
defend the suit, or to make some other arrangements with his creditor.
Most courts enforce the stautory provision requiring the plantiff to
post bond with someone other than himself as surety."" Most corporate
and some non-corporate plaintiffs furnish bonds executed by an in-
surance company or professional bonding company. Other plaintiffs
often persuade a property owner to act as surety.112 Both types of
surety meet the statutory requirements. A few courts indicate, how-
ever, that they accept the signature of the plaintiff himself when he
is known by the judge to be a responsible property owner in the
county. On some occasions they have accepted the plaintiff's personal
check as security.113 It seems clear that these latter two practices are in
derogation of the statutory requirements.
Creditors finding their collection objectives achieved through
garnishment before judgment often fail to request entry of a default
judgment. The clerk disburses money received from the garnishee be-
fore entry of judgment,114 sometimes without a disbursal order signed
by the judge." 5 A substantial number of suits remain on the court
docket books, to be subsequently filed away without entry of judg-
ment or dismissal order." 6
M Id.
112 This information was gained through questionnaires and interviews with
court clerks.
113 This information was gained through interv;ews with court clerks.
114 Question twenty-eight on the questionnaire asked: "Before judgment is
entered do you ever distr'bute to the creditor money obtained by wage garnish-
ment?' Twenty-one circuit court clerks, nine quarterly court clerks, and one
justice of the peace answered "Yes."
115 Question twenty-nine on the questionnaire asked: "If so [see note 114
supra], do you require a court order from the judge for distribution?" Four
circuit court clerks, five quarterly court clerks, and one justice of the peace
answered "Yes."
116 Question thirty on the questionnaire asked: "What percentage of suits,
involving garnishment before judgment and resulting in some money collected
by the court, are never terminated by either judgment or formal dismissal by the
creditor?" Ten circuit court clerks, six quarterly court clerks, and one justice of
the peace reported at least ten percent. Almost all clerks reported that some
suits are never terminated.
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IV. THE PAR=TS iN INTmmST
Previous sections of this article have suggested that, in effect, the
process of wage garnishment provides the Kentucky creditor with an
officially-authorized and publicly-supported collection device. To weigh
the value of wage garnishment and its impact as a collection device, it
is necessary to look carefully at the parties involved: the workingman
who is overextended financially and falling behind on his installment
payments; the creditor whose patience has worn thin and who is con-
vinced that only direct legal action will collect the overdue account;
and the employer who would prefer to remain uninvolved in his em-
ployee's financial problems.
A. The Creditor
Most creditors are aware of the harsh results of wage garnishment
and regard it as a collection device to be used infrequently and only
as a last resort. However, the pattern of consumer purchasing today
allows many opportunities for abuse of the legal process. Widespread
use of consumer credit has been partially responsible for the American
economy's great expansion, but consumer credit made easily available
always poses the danger of personal over-extension. Federal Reserve
Board statistics show a continuing increase in the level of personal
indebtedness." 7 A 1966 survey of consumer expenditures by the
Federal Bureau of Labor Standards determined that the average family
having a net income of less than four thousand dollars annually over-
spends that income."18
Some businessmen extend credit so that they may profit, not from
the sale of the goods financed, but rather from the credit charges
themselves. These businessmen are not looking for the responsible
credit risk, but for any buyer whose credit is backed by attachable
assets, among the best of which is a regular income. It is not that the
businessman seeks out buyers he expects to default, but merely that in
accepting credit customers, he is concerned only in being assured that
they are employed. Thus, he allows and even encourages credit for a
person already burdened with debts beyond his ability to pay. The
merchant believes that the buyer will struggle to make the payments
voluntarily and that if he fails, the payments may be obtained at his
117 U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEP'T OF LABOR, SummARdY OF STATE
LAws PROHrBrIING OR REGULATING =H BusINEsS OF DEBT POOLING 1 (Labor Law
Series No. 4-E, 1966).
118 U.S. Bu~x~u OF LABOR STANDARDS, DEI'T OF LABOR, DEBT POOLING AND
GsAIsmiNr IN RELATION TO CONSmhER INDEBTEDNEsS 1 (Fact Sheet Series
No. 4-F, 1966).
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employer's office. The creditor knows that the debtor's paycheck can
be reached by garnishment and that in procuring garnishment, the
race belongs to the most alert creditor, regardless of the age, kind, or
security of his debt. Moreover, the creditor is well aware that the
threat of garnishment often brings the result he seeks. This kind of
reasoning prevails, although the creditor must realize that garnishment
occasionally results in loss of the debtor's job 1 9 and destruction of his
capacity to pay any of his creditors.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to separate the "good" creditor
from the "bad." There is no way to restrict the use of garnishment to
the businessman who has extended credit wisely for a voluntary in-
stallment purchase and to forbid it to the less discreet merchant whose
business is built on the oversell of overpriced merchandise" to over-
burdened debtors. Of course, the unpaid creditor wishes to obtain pay-
ment with the least possible expense and trouble to himself and for the
small creditor, permitted to file suit for himself, early garnishment may
be the most inexpensive method of collection. He risks only court costs
which must be posted to begin the action, and which he may even-
tually recover from the debtor. Turning the account over to a profes-
sional collector would cost him from one fourth to one half the col-
lection.
Moreover, use of the confessed judgment may facilitate collection
by wage garnishment. A judgment confessed before an action is in-
stituted is unenforcable in Kentucky.121 However, after an action has
been filed and the debtor-defendant has come to the creditor-plaintiff
(perhaps as the result of garnishment) to seek more time in which to
pay his debt, or some reduction of it, the creditor's attorney may agree
to "work out" the debtor's problem if the debtor will confess judgment.
This procedure is entirely legal.122 A confessed judgment, appropriately
docketed, places in the creditor's hands a sword of Damocles over the
debtor, who must now live under the realization that at any time an
order to garnishee his wages may issue on the confessed judgment
without further legal process.
In filing suit and obtaining garnishment, the creditor always risks
losing the costs and other fees which he must advance if the debt
proves uncollectible. Successive garnishments incur successive fees;
this is a burden which some jurisdictions have attempted to meet by
19 Satter, Argument for Abolition of Wage Attachment, 52 IL.L. B.J. 1026,
1034 (1964).
120 See H. BLACE, Buy Now, PAY LATER (1961).
121 KRS § 372.140 (1962).
' 22 KRS § 454.090 (1962).
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providing for continuing execution on wages.123 This procedure usually
operates so that after the judgment creditor has served garnishment
papers once upon the employer, the levy continues against the debtor's
wages until the debt is paid in full. Although the costs of service and
process are thereby reduced, continuing execution has the undesirable
result of encouraging quick filing since the first in time will keep his
priority until his debt is satisfied.
A major worry of the creditor who resorts to garnishment for col-
lection is the possibility that the debtor may be forced into bank-
ruptcy, thereby avoiding or delaying the payment of most of his debts.
It can no longer be doubted that there is a strong correlation between
garnishment and bankruptcy. 24 Thus, the creditor is torn between
recognition that his garnishment action may be all that is needed to
push the hard-pressed debtor into insolvency and his legitimate need
and desire to collect debts owed to him.
B. The Debtor
The debtor threatened with wage garnishment is in a most un-
tenable position. On the one hand he owes a debt which he must pay.
On the other hand, payment of the debt either voluntarily or through
garnishment will leave almost nothing for the necessary living expenses
of himself and his family. Moreover, he knows that his employer does
not look kindly upon service of garnishment papers. Some firms will
dismiss an employee when his wages are garnisheed for the first
time,'12 5 and even the most lenient and sympathetic employers will
generally dismiss the worker who is the subject of frequent garnish-
ment.1
26
New York has recently recognized the interest of the debtor in job
security by passing a statute which provides: "A New York Employer
may not discharge or lay off an employee because of the service of an
income execution unless more than one such process has been served
123 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-361 (Supp. 1964); ILL. REV. STAT. tit.
13 § 3923 (1964).
124 Satter, Wage Assignments and Garnishments Cited as Major Cause of
Bankruptcy in Illinois, 15 PEns. FIN. L.Q. REP. 50 (1961). See also U.S. BUREAU
OF LAnOR STANDAPDS, DEPT or LABRor, DEBT POOLING AND GARNisomNT IN
RELATION TO CONSUmER INDEBTEDNESS 4 (Fact Sheet Series No. 4-F, 1966),
showing the correlation between strict garnishment laws and voluntary bankruptcy.
'2 5 Satter, supra note 119, at 1034-35.
126 A revealing discussion of the considerations involved in terminating em-
ployment after garnishment or attachment is to be found in CoMMRCE CLEARING
HOUSE, HANDBOOr ON ASSIGNMENT AND GAUNSHMENT OF WAGES § 9, § 935
(1966). Section nine treats labor union policy and Section 935 discusses legal and
non-legal considerations.
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within any 12-month period after January 1, 1967.127 While this
might appear to be minimal protection because most debtors sub-
jected to garnishment proceedings may be presumed to be falling be-
hind in obligations to several creditors, this probably provides a satis-
factory method for solving New York's problem.'28 Statistical surveys
of bankrupts indicate that garnishments are relied on by certain credi-
tors more than others, and few bankrupts reported receiving more than
one garnishment. 2 9 In addition, New York exempts ninety percent of
the workingman's wages from garnishment and as a result the process
is little used by creditors in any case.
The Kentucky debtor is at a further disadvantage because Kentucky
is one of fifteen states 30 which allow garnishment before judgment.
Moreover, since pre-judgment attachment is property-oriented and
most consumer debtors have little attachable property under KRS §
425.185,1' the creditor can usually obtain garnishment at the same
time he institutes the suit by simply asserting that to delay judgment
will endanger collection of the debt. 3 2 Thus, the debtor often finds his
wages garnisheed on the same day that he learns of the suit. This re-
sult is patently inequitable to the debtor who wishes to contest the
debt.
Notice to the debtor is a major problem. Obviously he is entitled
to a simple, uncomplicated explanation of the action, but frequently
his only notice consists of a copy of his employer's garnishment order
and a "summons" 33 from the sherifFs office, unaccompanied by a
127 N.Y.R. Crv. PRAc. § 5252.
128 The new federal Consumer Credit Protection Act may do even more
toward solving the problem throughout the United States. "No employer may
discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been sub-
jected to garnishment for any one indebtedness." Consumer Credit Protection Act
§ 340(a), 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1252. Although the employee ma
be fired if his earnings are garnisheed by more than one creditor, he is given job
security through at least one garnishment, and it appears that he will be protected
even after multiple garnishments if they are all by the same creditor. Such pro-
tection, howevei, is not effective until July 1, 1970.
1
29 G. BRuNNEF, PEsoxAL BAmup cwEs: TRENDs AND Cmuucrmurcs 95
(Ohio St. U., Bureau of Bus. Research Monograph No. 124, 1965).130 Alaska, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina and Utah.
131 KRS § 425.185 (1962) states:
The plaintiff, may, at or after the commencement of an action, have an
attachment .. . 1) in an action for the recovery of money against ...
absent or concealed debtors... 2) in an action for the recovery of money
due upon a contract, judgment or award, if the defendant have no prop-
erty in this state subject to execution, or not enough thereof to satisfy the
plaintiff's demand, and the collection of the demand will be endangered
by delay in obtaining judgment or a return of no property found ...
132 Note, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 323,
327 (1957).
183 See text at notes 84-89 and 84-87 supra.
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complaint. Unless he contacts the court to obtain a copy of the
complaint, he will not know exactly how his wages came to be
garnisheed. The vagueness of a simple summons combined with
general ignorance of the law undoubtedly contributes to the high
number of default judgments. Of course it should be recognized that
debtors rarely have a valid legal defense since they have usually
failed to perform their part of a contract.
During the period between initial garnishment and his next pay
check, the debtor has to meet routine living expenses for himself and
usually for a family. In recognition of society's interest in keeping its
members productive and providing for their families, most states have
some wage exemption provisions which limit the amount which can be
taken by a creditor through garnishment. Most commonly, a state will
use one of three exemption devices. It may specify a particular amount
which is immune from attachment or levy 34 or may set a percentage
of total wages which is immune from attachment. 13 5 Less often it may
declare that all wages earned within a stated period of time are
exempt.'8
8
Until 1966, Kentucky operated under a statute which was, at its
inception, liberal in its concern for the laborer. It allowed the worker
to keep ninety percent of his salary, limited however to a maximum of
$67.50 per month. In 1910, when the legislation was passed, this was
a generous exemption, but today it is totally inadequate. 37 In 1966,
the General Assembly revised the exemption section to exclude seventy-
five percent of net wages 38 earned during a pay period, unless the
debt owed was incurred in the purchase of necessities, in which case
the limit is fifty percent.'39
In practice it is apparent that present Kentucky law exempts from
garnishment only fifty percent of the worker's wages. "Necessities" is
134 In this category are Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island Tennessee, Vermont and Washington.
135 In this category are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
When it becomes effective July 1, 1970, Title III of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act will be a combination of this and the preceding device and will
effect all states whose own exemption statutes are not more favorable to the
debtor. See note 147 infra.
136 In this category are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, and South Carolina.
137 In 1910 this mounted to a 100% exemption for most workingmen. Note,
Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects 45 Ky. L.J. 322, 329 (1957).
1,8 KRS § 427.010 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966). The term "net
wages" is defined by K.RS § 425.210(3) (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp.
1966).
'39 KRS § 427.010 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
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broadly defined to include "articles of food, clothing (including shoes),
medicine, medical services, drugs, rent, public utilities, furniture and
household appliances,"140 i.e., nearly all consumer expenditures. The
Honorable Joe Lee, Referee in Bankruptcy for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, suggested in a recent article that:
The amendment adding "furniture and household appliances" to this list
of necessities was unfortunate. All the items or services in this category
in . . . [the bill as originally introduced to the Kentucky General As-
sembly] were consumables. Therefore, the seller or person furnishing the
services could not bring an action for replevin. However, furniture and
household appliances are customarily sold subject to a security interest re-
tained by the seller. He ordinarily has a remedy by contract and at law
for recovery of his property. Therefore it is questionable wheher he should
be permitted to attach fifty per cent of the debtor's net wages as payments
on the contract of sale.141
Whether or not one agrees with this argument, it is apparent that the
only consumer creditor unable to easily slip into a low-exemption
category is the small loan company. However Judge Lee points out
that:
the fifty per cent exemption rate might be held applicable in suits by
small loan companies on notes which are secured by security agreements
covering furniture and household appliances. These loans, which remain
collectable over a fifteen year period should not fall in the same classifica-
tion as open-account sales of consumable goods and services, the col-
lection of which may be barred by the five year statute of limitations.142
The necessities provision seems likely to have an effect dramatically
opposed to the Legislature's intent. The sponsors of this provision ap-
parently believed that a businessman who has extended credit for basic
needs such as food and shelter is entitled to preference in his attempts
to recover payment. This belief has a paradoxical effect in practice be-
cause the low-income family which lives on a strict budget and buys
nothing except "necessities" may find itself trying to meet current ex-
penses out of half a pay check because the other fifty percent has been
sequestered by a garnisheeing creditor. His neighbor who borrows
money from a small loan company to play at the racetrack is protected
under current law to the extent of seventy-five percent of his salary.
In any event, the workingman who is having trouble paying last
month's grocery bill is undoubtedly going to need most of his wages to
meet this month's bill.
Additional problems arise for the debtor who owes-as he often
does-more than one creditor. A single garnishment leaves little for cur-
140 Id.
'41 Lee, Kentucky's New Exemption Law, 55 Ky. L.J. 618, 627 (1967).
342 Id. at 628.
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rent expenses, much less anything for payments to his remaining
creditors. This could result in a parade of creditors to the sheriff's
office, each seeking to be the first to attach the next pay check, winner
take fifty or twenty-five percent, while the helpless debtor falls further
and further behind in his other debts.143 Small wonder that so many
debtors resort to bankruptcy to escape garnishment.
At the very least, the debtor has an interest in knowing before any
communication to his employer, that his wages are about to be gar-
nisheed. He may desire to work out a private arrangement to pay the
debt in a manner which would assure the suing creditor of his good
faith and still leave something for other expenses. The law should en-
courage such conduct, but instead it tends to foster in response to the
sudden, unannounced attack of garnishment.
C. The Employer
Of the three direct parties to garnishment, the employer would, at
first glance, seem to have the least concern. After all, he is little more
than a spectator to the tug of war between debtor and creditor. Yet, in
the long run, it is perhaps the employer's interests which are most
affected. He must accept significant bookkeeping expense and in-
convenience in processing garnishment papers. He may also lose the
services of a trained and efficient worker if that worker is unable to
perform effectively while burdened by financial problems. Many em-
ployers are interested in helping the harassed employee find a way to
discharge his debts as painlessly as possible, but they do not know
what their duty is, once served with summons.
The employer served with notice of garnishment is actually the
defendant in a separate proceeding. If he fails to respond and pay the
correct amount into court, he is subject to contempt proceedings and
direct suit by the creditor for costs the creditor may have incurred
by reason of the garnishee's resistance.
Moreover, the employer is confronted with the possibility that he
may make an honest error in calculating the amount. This error might
result in personal liability of the employer to either the creditor or the
employee for loss or injury.14 4 Until 1966 this risk was more signi-
ficant for the employer whose good intentions led him to deduct the
$67.50 exemption from wages submitted to the garnisheeing com-
plainant. KRS § 425.190 (4) stated that a debtor "may" appear on
judgment day to claim his exemptions. An early case, Holbrook v.
'43 KRS § 425.190(7) (1962) and KRS § 425.220 (1962) establish a policy
of "first in line" where multiple garnishments are required.
144 KRS §§ 425.315-.325 (1962).
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Fyffe,' 45 ruled that a garnishee could not assert the debtor's exemption.
Therefore, an employer had to turn over the entire salary unless the
debtor appeared in court to request his exemptions. However, the
1966 revision authorized the employer to automatically pay the exempt
portion to the employee.
146
D. The Public
The public plays a significant role in the process of wage garnish-
ment. Since the right arises solely by statute, the elected representa-
tives of the public must have considered the policy behind the right
and found it compelling. However, those representatives have a re-
sponsibility to continually examine the structure and the purpose of
the remedy, looking squarely at the basic conflict between the credi-
tor's interest in collection and the consumer's need for protection, to
decide if revision is needed.
Beyond this basic conflict, the immediate cost to the public is obvi-
ous when the employee loses his job. At the very best he loses worktime
and income while looking for new employment. At worst he resorts to
bankruptcy, thus defaulting on all his debts while he and his family
become public charges if he is not readily able to find suitable employ-
ment.
The 90th Congress recognized the significant public interest in the
realm of garnishment when it enacted the Consumer Credit Protection
Act which includes restrictions on garnishment. The Congress found
that garnishment frequently burdens interstate commerce and frus-
trates the bankruptcy laws.
41
It may be argued that wage garnishment does not initiate the
145 164 Ky. 435, 175 S.W. 977 (1915).
146KRS § 425.210 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
147 The Consumer Credit Protection Act § 301 states:
(a) the Congress finds:
(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal
services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit Such
extensions of credit divert money into excessive credit payments and
thereby hinder the production and flow of goods in interstate commerce.
(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently
results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption
of employment, production, and consumption constitute a substantial
burden on interstate commerce.
(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several States relating
to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bank-
ruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the
country.
(b) On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section,
the Congress determines that the provisions of this title are necessary
and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of the
(Continued on next page)
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financial troubles which force a debtor into bankruptcy. Garnishment
is the result, not the cause. However, there is striking evidence in
several recent studies148 which indicates that garnishment is often the
precipitating factor in bankruptcy. When a consumer is overextended
and struggling to keep all his creditors contented, garnishment or the
threat of garnishment is frequently the final blow. Data to this effect
is now widely available, 149 but specific reference should be made to a
1965 California study.150 This study shows that states with the lowest
bankruptcy filings per capita are mainly those that either prohibit wage
garnishments or severely restrict their use.1 1 One may pointedly con-
trast the high and rising rate of bankruptcy in California which
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 1252.
To remedy the conditions stated above, Congress has exempted from garnish-
ment all but twenty-five percent of a person's disposable earnings or "the amount
by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal
minimum hourly wage... in enfect at the time the earnings are payable, which-
ever is less." § 803(a). "Disposable earnings" is defined by § 802(b) as "that
part ...remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts re-
quired by law to be withheld.' The exemption does not apply to orders for
support, orders by bankruptcy courts under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,
or debts due for state or federal taxes. § 803(b). Congress also afforded job
security to debtors. See note 128 supra.
Title III (Restriction on Garnishment) of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act is not effective until July 1, 1970. It will not annul, alter, or affect any law
which Kentucky or any other state has enacted whose provisions concerningexemptions and job security are more restrictive upon creditors. § 307. The only
major alteration of present Kentucky law will be the denial of fifty percent wagegamishment to creditors now authorized under KRS § 427.010(2) 1962), as
amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966), and the creation of limited job security.A recent comment on the Consumer Credit Protection Act indicated that:
[ilt may reasonably by anticipated that there will be an immediate
decline in the number of filings of wage-earner bankruptcies when the
Federal restrictions on wage garnishment become effective two years
hence.
News and Editorial Comment 42 REF. J. 66 (1968). Recent experience in the
Eastern District of Kentucky owever, indicates that the above comment may be
overly optimistic. Kentucky s present wage exemption statute (with percentage
restrictions similar to those of the Consumer Credit Protection Act) was enacted
in 1966. In fiscal years 1965 and 1966, 1243 and 1465 bankruptcy petitions,
respectively, were filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky by wage earners.
Even after a full year of operation under the new statute the upward trend con-
tinued as 1661 petitions were filed in fiscal year 1967. At this time no figures are
available for the fiscal year 1968, but there is no evidence to indicate a reversal
of the trend. The effect of the new federal job security provision upon bank-
ruiptcies remains to be seen, but the protection afforded is so limited that no major
reuction in filings is anticipated.
148 See Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregon?, 40 REF. J. 78
(1966); R. DOLPHIN, AN ANALYsIs oF EcoNOMIc AND PERSONAL FAcToRs LEAD-
ING TO CONstnmu BANimUPTcy (Mich. St. U. Bureau of Bus. & Econ. Research,
Occasional Paper No. 15, 1965); Address by Linn K. Twinem, Natl Retail
Merchants Ass n, in Dallas, Texas, April 30, 1963.
149 E.g., Brunner, supra note 129.
150 Bruun, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations,
53 CALIP. L. REv. 1214, 1235 (1965).
151 Id.
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exempts only fifty percent of the debtor's wages with that of New York
which exempts ninety percent and has only one-fifth the bankruptcy
rate of California.
15 2
One might ask what the effect would be if Kentucky creditors
were denied the use of garnishment as a collection tool. A survey of
Kentucky magistrates and circuit courts tended to corroborate the
California study, by indicating that garnishments are mainly at-
tributable to credit purchases by consumers or to hospital and medical
service claims. 153 In particular, a sampling of employers in central
Kentucky revealed that specific firms specializing in high-pressure sales
of furniture, jewelry, and installment purchases would appear again
and again as garnisheeing plaintiffs.'5 4 Collection agencies often argue
that without wage garnishment or the threat of garnishment they
would be unable to collect their bills and that injury to the credit
economy would result. It is probably true that wages are the sole
attachable asset of many debtors, now that Kentucky law exempts his
automobile.165 However, experience in other states indicates that the
ability to use wage garnishment seems to have no real effect on the
extension of credit.1 6 Those states which exempt ninety or one hundred
percent of the debtor's salary do not show any constriction of credit.
In fact, New York with its high exemption has a slightly higher ratio of
credit sales than does California with its low exemption. The same
ratio of installment credit to retail sales (approximately 1 to 4) pre-
vails in the examination of Colorado, Texas, Florida, North Carolina,
and Alabama, although three of those states have one hundred percent
exemption. 15
7
A recent commentator in Pennsylvania, analyzing the total exemption
policy of that state, argued that the growth of the credit economy has
been accompanied by a parallel development in the field of credit
management and security.5 s He pointed out that Article IX of the
Uniform Commercial Code offers the creditor an opportunity to per-
fect a security interest in almost any kind of property. Moreover, in-
surance protection has become so widespread that medical practi-
tioners are partially protected, and the small creditor has the advantage
of improved credit reporting and private collection systems.
152 Id. at 1240.
153 Unpublished survey of Lexington area employers, 1967, on file with
Associate Professor Robert M. Viles at the University of Kentucky, College of Law.
154 Id.
155 KRS § 427.010 (1962), as amended, (Cumin. Supp. 1966).
156 Bruun, supra note 149, at 1236.
157 Id.
158 Boddington, Garnishment of Wages in Pennsylvania, Its History and
Rationale, 70 DicK. L. REv. 653, 659 (1966).
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Nevertheless, it is true that those states which exempt all wages do
show a slightly lower rate of recovery by collection agencies. In
balancing the pros and cons of stringent garnishment policy, there is
still the likelihood that a few individual creditors would suffer loss if
garnishment were abolished.
V. RECOM MDATIONS
It is not the purpose of this note to offer a "model garnishment law"
for Kentucky, but merely to focus attention on the expectations of all
the parties in interest and the policies underlying the practice. In-
evitably, however, certain reforms suggest themselves for specific dis-
cussion.
Any critical analysis of garnishment must recognize that the legal
arm of the state is being used in lieu of a professional, private bill
collector. Because a great many merchants extend credit for the
purpose of making a profit from credit charges themselves, the state
has become a party to the development of credit practices which range
from unwise to shoddy. Secure in the knowledge that a significant
portion of the debtor's salary can be reached through garnishment,
creditors can afford to indulge in irresponsible business judgment con-
cerning the risk.
An increasing number of states have moved to totally exempt wages
from garnishment where the debt is one for consumer purchases. This
has the effect of forcing the businessman to carefully analyze his
credit policy. Yet, as previously noted, such a total exemption does not
significantly reduce the volume of consumer business. But if the Ken-
tucky Legislature should decide to revise the wage garnishment laws
by raising the exemption, it must consider the creditor's interests. At
present, wage garnishment is the only effective legal process available
to collect consumer debts where there is no security interest.
Kentucky does not have a small claims court system which might
give the merchant-creditor legal assistance in collecting from a re-
calcitrant debtor. Thus, unless the public is willing to leave the re-
sponsibility for credit collection entirely upon the businessman, it is
probably necessary to retain some form of garnishment remedy. Never-
theless, it is apparent that Kentucky attorneys and judges need to take
a more direct role in protecting the debtor from inequitable treatment.
Since the creditor is often the only visible party, the tendency has been
to give him the benefit of the doubt.
Wage attachment is a form of economic warfare between debtor
and creditor and can be justified only as a last resort. It should be
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limited to the judgment creditor-the man who has proved his case in
court. There are occasionally actions in which a plaintiff is well ad-
vised to protect his right to a defendant's assets before a judgment, but
these are not actions on a debt where the only assets available are the
man's wages. It does not jeopardize the creditor's collateral to insist
that he allow the debtor his day in court before commencing a direct
assault on the debtor's salary.
Insistence on judgment would reduce the likelihood of a debtor
being completely unaware of an impending garnishment. Since many
debtors are unaware of their legal rights and duties, every effort should
be made to protect them. Thus, Kentucky should require notice to the
debtor that his wages are to be garnisheed before the garnishment sum-
mons is sent to his employer. Five days notice to the debtor would
give him further opportunity to devise a suitable payment arrange-
ment.
Kentucky does not presently allow multiple garnishments; only one
creditor may levy at a time, and priority goes to the first in line at
the courthouse. 59 The law should be revised to allow the first creditor
who is awarded judgment to attach the wages and to have that at-
tachment continue until the full amount due is paid off. This would
mean that the employer, in effect, acts as a withholding agent for the
creditor's benefit. But the employer would find this regular deduction
far less cumbersome than the paper work and court appearances re-
quired when a new garnishment summons appears every pay period.
The employee would be benefited because he would not have to bear
the extra expense of repeated process costs for each separate garnish-
ment.16
0
A higher degree of protection against loss of earnings should be
made available to the debtor through an increase in the exemption
rate. Seventy-five percent is hardly adequate for the average man who
must meet daily expenses of maintaining himself and his family.
Both debtor and creditor would benefit from the enactment of a
strong job security statute. The employee's discharge simply because
his wages have been garnisheed only compounds his trouble and makes
it almost certain that the creditor will not get the rest of his money.
The above recommendations are conservative and attempt to
recognize the valid concerns of the creditor. Some states are experi-
menting, however, with a law which denies any wage garnishment
159 KBS §§ 425.210-.280 (1962).
160 For a law allowing the employer to deduct installment payments on a
continuing lien, see LA. Binv. STAT., tit. 12 § 3923 (1964) and N.Y.1L Civ. PRAc.
§ 5231(e).
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where the underlying indebtedness arose from installment purchases.""'
This exemption has the advantage of protecting the small merchant,
e.g., grocer, druggist, who extends credit occasionally, but it recognizes
the possibility of abuse by the retailer who hopes to profit by the sale
of credit as well as by the sale of merchandise. It also protects the
special creditor, such as the holder of a court order for support or
alimony.
Before any revision is made, however, one hopes that Kentucky
citizens will review the facts and make a basic decision concerning
garnishment law. Will it continue to be a publicly subsidized, widely
available form of debt collection? Or will it be seen as an ultimate
weapon, to be wielded most cautiously and only after having given
careful attention to all the alternatives?
Natalie S. Wilson 
2
Kenneth P. Alexander& ' 3
161 E.g., DEL. CODE Asm. tit. 10 § 10-4913(b) (1953) and S.C. CoDE §
10-1731 (1962).
162 1ntroduction and Parts I, IV and V.
163 Parts II, III and the appendix.
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APPENDIX
TYPICAL COURT COSTS IN SUIT INVOLVING OvEa Fn-ry Doumas'
Filing Suit and Obtaining Judgment:
State tax'65  $ 5.00
County library fee166  1.00
Clerk's fees:167
Filing complaint (two copies)168  $ .80
Filing each exhibit (two copies) 6 9  .60
Docketing suit1 70  .25
Indexing in the general index (two parties) .60
Issuing summons (two copies) 1.10
Entering return of summons .40
Filing affidavit for default judgment .40
Entering judgment 1.25
Taxation of costs (one party) 171  .75 6.15
Sheriff's fees: 172
Executing and returning summons 173  2.00
$14.15
Obtaining Order of Garnishment:
Clerk's fees: 1' 4
Filing affidavit for garnishment .40
Docketing affidavit for garnishment .25
Issuing order of garnishment (four copies) 1.90
Entering return of order of garnishment .40
164 This appendix is based on the practice in one circuit court and is typical
of practice in other circuit courts. Practice in quarterly and iustice's courts varies
so greatly that it is impossible to compile a typical schedule of court costs for these
lower tribunals.
165 KRS § 142.011(1) (1962).
166 KRS § 172.180(3) (b) (1962).
167KRS § 64.010 (1962).
168 Because they are not required to attach a copy of the complaint to the
summons served upon the defendant, many attorneys leave a second copy of the
complaint, with exhibits, with the court clerk to be picked up by the defendant.
169 Copies of sales contracts, security agreements, and loan agreements are
often attached to the complaint as exhibits.
170 The circuit court used as a model assesses a docketing fee for each day
in which some entry is made in the docket books (except the day in which suit
is filed).
171 If the defendant appears in court and incurs expenses to be taxed to him,
there will be an additional fee of $.75.
172 KRS § 64.090 (1962).
17I addition, KRS § 64.095 (1962) authorizes collection of ten cents per
mile as travel allowance for expenses incurred by sheriffs in executing a summons.
174 See note 167 supra.
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Recording bond 75  1.50
Disbursing proceeds of garnishment 1.25 5.70
SherifFs fees: 17
6
Summoning garnishee 177  2.00
$7.70
Total Cost of Judgment Plus One Garnishment $21.85
175 This fee is applicable only where garnishment is obtained before judg-
ment. Once posted, bond would normally be sufficient to cover all subsequent
garnishments obtained in the same suit.
176 See note 172 supra.
177 See note 173 supra.
